The Victors: Eisenhower and His Boys : The Men of World War II by Stephen Ambrose Read Free Book Online Page B

matter frequently calls for more courage than any other thing you will have to do, but I expect you to be perfectly cold-blooded about it.”
    To his old friend Gen. Leonard Gerow, then training an infantry division in Scotland, Eisenhower expanded on the theme. “Officers that fail,” he said, “must be ruthlessly weeded out. Considerations of friendship, family, kindliness, and nice personality have nothing whatsoever to do with the problem. . . . You must be tough.” He said it was necessary to get rid of the “lazy, the slothful, the indifferent or the complacent.” Whether Eisenhower could steel himself sufficiently in this regard remained to be seen.  Patton tightened discipline to a martinet standard while his whirlwind tours in his open command car, horns blaring and outriders roaring ahead and behind him, impressed his presence on everyone in the corps. His flamboyant language and barely concealed contempt for the British created pride in everything American.  When British officers made slighting remarks about American fighting qualities, Patton thundered, “We’ll show ‘em,” and then demanded to know where in hell the Brits had been during the crisis of Kasserine. But British Gen. Harold Alexander told Patton to avoid pitched battles and stay out of trouble.  Not being allowed to attack, forced to stand to one side while Montgomery delivered the final blow to the Afrika Korps, was galling to Patton. He asked Eisenhower to send him back to Morocco, where he could continue his planning for the invasion of Sicily. Eisenhower did so, replacing Patton with the recently arrived Gen. Omar Bradley, his old West Point classmate. Then Eisenhower told Alexander that it was essential that the Americans have their own sector in the final phase of the Tunisian campaign. Alexander replied that the Americans had failed at Kasserine and thus their place was at the rear.  Eisenhower held his temper, but his words were firm. He told Alexander that the United States had given much of its best equipment to the British. If the American people came to feel that their troops would not play a substantial role in the European Theater, they would be more inclined to insist on an Asia-first strategy. But most of all, Eisenhower insisted, Alexander had to realize that in the ultimate conquest of the Nazis, the Americans would necessarily provide the bulk of the fighting men and carry most of the load. It was therefore imperative that American soldiers gain confidence in their ability to fight the Germans, and they could not do so while in the rear. Alexander tried to debate the point, but Eisenhower insisted, and eventually Alexander agreed to place II Corps on the line, on the north coast.
    Having persuaded the reluctant Alexander, Eisenhower turned his attention to Bradley. He told Bradley that he realized the sector assigned to II Corps was poorly suited to offensive action, but insisted that Bradley had to overcome the difficulties and prove that the U.S. Army “can perform in a way that will at least do full credit to the material we have.” He instructed Bradley to plan every operation “carefully and meticulously, concentrate maximum fire power in support of each attack, keep up a constant pressure and convince everyone that we are doing our full part. . . .” He concluded by warning Bradley to be tough.  Eisenhower said he had just heard of a battalion of infantry that had suffered a loss of ten men killed and then asked permission to withdraw and reorganize.  That sort of thing had to cease. “We have reached the point where troopsmust secure objectives assigned,” Eisenhower said, “and we must direct leaders to get out andlead and to secure the necessary results .” Eisenhower spent the last week of April touring the front lines, and was pleased by what he saw. Bradley was “doing a great job,” he concluded, and he was delighted to hear a British veteran say that the U.S. 1st Infantry Division was “one