Those Who Have Borne the Battle by James Wright Read Free Book Online

be necessary or expected as a result of meeting the terms of the contract.
    There was a flaw in this logic, though, evident at the outset, as the colonies needed to find some means to fill the ranks of the regular army with volunteers—and to sustain the ranks of the militia beyond minimum obligations. Conscious of this difficulty, Washington pointed out that patriotism may have led officers to enlist at the outset of the Revolution, but this could not be sustained. “Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of . . . private interest or advantage, to the common good.” Washington believed that no army could survive for long if it relied only on a sense of public virtue to maintain its officers and enlisted men. 6
    Argued differently, more bluntly, Port Folio , an aggressive nationalist publication, asked in 1813, “Are republics necessarily framed to be, in all respects, ungrateful? Will they bestow on their champions neither riches nor honors, gratification nor fame? Must their warriors fight in the character of amateurs, purely for the sake of killing and dying and when they fall must Oblivion receive them to her blighted embrace?” 7
    The reluctance to extend favors to veterans who did not have significant injuries was rooted in Republican opposition to establishing in this new nation a class of pensioners. There was a sense that part of the corruption of Europe stemmed from the extension of pensions and sinecures to favored individuals and classes. America had neither the inclination nor the financial means to follow this aristocratic path of favoritism. Congress did accept individual petitions for support, but its approach remained cautious and very conservative. Veterans had no more right to receive government support than other suffering citizens did. The Congressional Committee on Claims said in response to petitions from indigent veterans with claims of war-related injuries, “Congress cannot undertake the support of paupers merely because they may have been at some period of their lives engaged in the public service.” Patriots could not expect special treatment. 8
    The position that wartime service was an obligation of citizenship, without pensions and other recognition, was mirrored in the common
attitude toward war memorials, at least as a responsibility of the national government. By the time of his death in 1799, Washington was a true national hero, but a proposal to construct a mausoleum for the man in the new capital city failed to garner sufficient support. As late as 1817, John Adams reminded advocates of federal sponsorship of memorials that official government paintings and statuary “have in all ages and Countries of which we have any Information, been enlisted on the side [of] Despotism and Superstition.” 9 Nevertheless, by 1817 the dominant narrative of shared responsibility for democracy, with no expectation of recognition or gratuity—or memorials—was already losing ground in the Republic.
    Â 
    Â 
    Within twenty-five years of the writing of the Constitution, the revolutionary generation and the Americans of the nineteenth century began to rethink their basic views toward those who fought their wars. One catalyst for this change was that veterans proved effective in demanding more from the Republic that, after all, their service had created. The officers had organized at Newburgh in the Society of the Cincinnati, a hereditary organization of Revolutionary War officers who had served in the Revolution and who reminded all of their patriotic service and of their needs. Increasingly, enlisted men also informally articulated their needs and expectations. No major organization of enlisted veterans existed. Surviving veterans, often by their presence, symbolized a growing sense of nationalism—and this spurred a sense of gratitude, not to mention guilt.
    The narrative of heroic service elicited a sense of guilt from those who did not