conflict and Liberianleader CharlesTaylor with sustaining it. While it did not totally discount these factors, [22] theCommission focused on internal factors, such as bad governance and corruption, and the betrayal of Sierra Leone by its political, financial and intellectual leaders. As the Report noted,
. . . the civil war in Sierra Leone was largely the result of dysfunctional governance and institutional processes in the country. Political actors failed to sustain the state's capacity to meet such critical challenges as the security, livelihood and participation in decision making of the overwhelming majority of Sierra Leoneans. The Commission shares the view that the failure of governance provided a context conducive for the interplay of poverty, marginalisation, greed and grievance that caused and sustained the civil war. [23]
The conclusion was a depressing one, because the Commission noted that many of these root causes remain unchanged in post‐conflict Sierra Leone. Moreover, there is little or no commitment by those who govern the country to any meaningful attempt to address these factors. At the same time, it is a conclusion that is pregnant with optimism, for it provides Sierra Leoneans with a framework by which they can change their own destiny. An analysis focusing on external causes would have both exonerated Sierra Leoneans from responsibility and at the same time left them helpless to change things.
The atrocities committedby the RUF are well‐known outside Sierra Leone, in contrast with those committed by the pro‐government militias and similar forces. This is reflected within Sierra Leone in a tendency by some to overlook crimes committed by the anti‐RUF forces, who, it is said, were fighting a just cause. The Commission rejected this “just war” approach to the conflict. Even if a right and wrong side in the conflict could be identified – something the Commission did not even consider – the TRC's mandate was to address violations and abuses, whatever the identity of the perpetrator. Anecdotal evidence and intuitionthat the RUF was responsible for the majority of the violations was confirmed in analysis of the Commission's data base. But the atrocities committed by the pro‐governmentCivil Defense Forces (CDF), and notably by one sub‐group of them known as the kamajors , were on a par with the worst theRUF had to offer.
A great deal of attention has also been paid to the role of mineral resources, and especially diamonds, which are found in abundance in Sierra Leone. [24] The Commission found that the rebels had not been focused on control of the diamondiferous regions of the country, at least in the early years of the conflict. [25] In other words, although low‐technology diamond mining is one of the important features of Sierra Leone's economy, diamond smuggling cannot be viewed as a principal cause of the conflict. These findings in effect throw the ball back into thecourt of Sierra Leone's governing elite. Its historic greed and indifference to the lot of the ordinary people would appear to be the underlying theme in the conflict. This was certainly the source of the discontent that provoked the original rebel incursions, and generated much initial sympathy and support forthe RUF. But in the end, the RUF had no greater vision of the future of the country than those it sought to overthrow.
In its findings, the Commission considered the amnesty provision that was included in the Lomé Agreement . Commissioners were well aware of the prevailing view in international law whereby such blanket amnesties are unacceptable. [26] Of course, the view was also reflected in the statement appended to the Lomé Agreement by the Special Representative of the Secretary‐General. A judgment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, issued in March 2004, declared the amnesty to be in breach of international law. [27] But the Commission felt it could not second‐guess the negotiators