Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice by Naomi Roht-Arriaza Read Free Book Online

Human Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights . In other words, it was to consider not only civil and political rights but also economic, social and cultural rights. Instructions along these lines were given to statement takers as guidance for their interviews with victims.
    The value of an approach stressing the indivisibility of human rights became abundantly clear when victims reported to the Commission. Although they would describe their initial victimization in terms of physical violence or destruction of property, by and large they told the Commission that they were not seeking compensation or restitution tied to these specific harms, but rather “schooling for my children”, “medical care” and “decent housing.” For the victims of terrible brutality, the future lay in the vindication of their economic and social rights, rather than some classic legal concept of restitutio in integrum .
    The Commission's mandate had both fact‐finding and therapeutic dimensions. As then‐Attorney General Solomon Berewa (currently Vice‐President) put it, “far from being fault‐finding and punitive, it is to serve as the most legitimate and credible forum for victims to reclaim their human worth; and a channel for the perpetrators of atrocities to expiate their guilt, and chasten their consciences. The process was likened to a national catharsis, involving truth telling, respectful listening and above all, compensation for victims in deserving cases.” [20] The “Memorandum of Objects and Reasons,” which was attached to the TRC Act , noted that the Peace Agreement “envisaged the proceedings of the Commission as a catharsis for constructive interchange between the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses.”
    The work of the TRC consisted of two principal phases. The first, described as the “statement taking phase,” began in December 2002. Approximately seventy “statement takers” were recruited throughout the country. Most were drawn from various sectors of civil society, such as NGOs and religious institutions. Attention was paid to ensuring that a significant percentage of the statement takers were women. Fluency in local languages was one of the main criteria in the hiring of statement takers. The statement taking proceeded until March 2003. Approximately 7,000 statements, mainly from victims but with a not unsubstantial number of perpetrators, were compiled. The statements wereanalysed in order to identify “window cases,” that is, representative statements that served to illustrate important aspects of the conflict. All of the statements were also coded and entered into a computerized data base for the purpose of statistical analysis.
    The second phase, known as the “hearings phase,” began in April 2003 and continued until early August 2003. Many of the hearings brought together victims and perpetrators for what were sometimes quite dramatic exchanges, and the occasional public reconciliation. These hearings were held throughout the country, often in isolated towns that were only accessible by helicopter. Other hearings focused on thematic issues, such as the media, the legal profession, governance, and corruption.
    Unfortunately, the hearings concluded with a rather unsatisfactory performance byPresident Tejan Kabbah. In contrast with all of the other leaders of various factions in the conflict,Kabbah refused to acknowledge any responsibility or to apologize to the people of Sierra Leone for his own role in the conflict.
     
 
    H.E. Dr. Tejan Kabbah :
Now, I think what you are asking me to do is this: to apologise to people for wrong doing . . . Of what use is that and I have mentioned this again in that record; I don't know, maybe it's a bit long you haven't read it all; but I said this, that I went round this country telling people, please I beg you, wrongs that have been done one way or the other, accept what it is, just forget about the past; let's