Bravo two zero by Andy McNab Read Free Book Online Page A

It was time for a break, or we'd begin to make mistakes. You only rush your planning if you have to.
        We had a brew and stretched our legs before getting down to the business of how to destroy Scud.
        Thirty-seven feet long and about 3 feet wide, the Russian-built SS-1C Scud-B had a range of 100-175 miles. It was transported on, and fired from, an eight wheeled TEL (transporter erector launcher). Crews were trained to operate from points of maximum concealment. Not very accurate, Scud was designed to strike at major storage sites, marshaling areas, and airfields, and was almost more of a propaganda weapon. As well as conventional high explosive, it could carry chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads.
        When our armored divisions were sent to Saudi, a rumor had circulated that if Saddam Hussein used chemicals against British forces, Mrs.
        Thatcher had instructed the generals to go tactical nuclear. I never thought that in my lifetime I'd find myself up against chemical agents.
        No one in their right mind would use them, but here was a man who had done so against Iran and his own people and would no doubt do so again in this war if the need arose.
        "There are maybe fifteen to twenty TELs but many more missiles," Bert said. "You can expect the TEL to be accompanied by a command vehicle, like a Land Cruiser, with the commander and/or the surveyor aboard. In the TEL itself will be the crew, two in the front, and other operators in the back. The command post within the TEL itself is in the center of the vehicle, entry being via a door on the left-hand side. There might be infantry in support, but we don't know how many-nor whether there might be several TELs together in convoy, or operating individually."
        It became clear that the surveyor was the main personality at a Scud launch. After the transporter rumbled up to an unprepared site, there was a wait of about an hour before the Scud could be launched. The time was spent in accurate site surveying, radar tracking of upper atmosphere balloons, calculating such factors as angle of deflection, and pumping in of propellants. There were a couple of lesser players, too-the commander, and the operators in the control center who tapped in the coordinates. That made a minimum of three people to be killed in order to render the launcher totally inoperable. However, they could be replaced. We'd still have to deal with the Scud.
        How would we destroy it? Air strikes are all very well, but we knew that the Iraqis had excellent DF (direction finding) capability, and we had to assume the worst scenario-that their DF equipment was intact and operational. It worked via a series of listening posts dotted around the country that shot a bearing out to the source of a radio signal. It only took two such bearings to pinpoint a position; it would then be very easy for them to get hold of us, especially if we were on foot.
        Calling in an air strike would effectively mean that we had gone overt.
        We'd only use air strikes if the Iraqis made us an offer we couldn't refuse-say, the world's supply of Scuds in convoy. Then we'd just have to get on the net (radio network) and take a chance of getting DF'd. We had to assume that they'd know we were there anyway just because the strike had been directed in.
        If we were going to attack the missile itself, there were dangers with the warhead. We wouldn't know if it was chemical, biological, nuclear, or conventional, and we didn't want to have to take the precaution of attacking with NEC protective clothing on because it takes time to put on and slows you down badly. The fuel was also a problem, being highly noxious.
        The TEL itself would be a better target, because without it the rockets couldn't be launched.
        "Can we destroy it?" Bob said.
        "Probably, but we don't know how easy it would be to repair," Dinger said. "And anyway, it's too near the