Conversations with Stalin by Milovan Djilas Read Free Book Online

everything that had to do with the very essence of our struggle—the new regime and the social changes. It went even so far as to retouch my style, cutting out every figure of speech that was the least bit unusual, shortening sentences, and striking out turns of phrase. The article became gray and uninspired. After tussling with one of their editors, I agreed to the crippling; it was senseless to create antagonism over something like that, and it was better to publish it as it was than not at all.
    The affair with
Novoe Vremia
led to even more serious trouble. Their castration of my style and my inspirations was somewhat less drastic, but they diluted or ejected practically everything that had to do with affirming the originality and extraordinary significance of Tito’s personality. In my first conference with one of the editors of
Novoe Vremia
, I agreed to some immaterial changes. It was only at the second conference—when it became clear to me that in the USSR no one can be magnified except Stalin and when the editor openly admitted this in these words: “It is awkward because of Comrade Stalin; that’s the way it is here”—that I agreed to the other changes; all the more so since the article had preserved its color and essence.
    For me and for other Yugoslav Communists Stalin’s leadership was indisputable. Yet I was nonetheless puzzled why other Communist leaders—in this case, Tito—could not be praised if they deserved it, from the Communist point of view.
    It is worth noting that Tito himself was very flattered by the article and that, to the best of my knowledge, the Soviet press had never published such high praise of any other living person.
    This is to be explained by the fact that Soviet public opinion—that is, the opinion of the Party, since no other kind exists—was enthusiastic about the Yugoslav struggle. But also because in the course of the war the atmosphere of Soviet society had changed.
    As I look back, I can say that the conviction spread spontaneously in the USSR that now, after a war that had demonstrated the devotion of the Soviet people to their homeland and to the basic achievements of the revolution, there would be no further reason for the political restrictions and for the ideological monopolies held by little groups of leaders, and especially by a single leader. The world was changing before the very eyes of the Soviet people. It was obvious that the USSR would not be the only socialist country and that new revolutionary leaders and tribunes were making their appearance.
    Such an atmosphere and such opinions did not hinder the Soviet leaders at the time; on the contrary, these opinions contributed to the war effort. There was no reason for the leaders themselves not to encourage such illusions. After all, Tito, or, rather, the struggle of the Yugoslavs, was bringing about changes in the Balkans and in Central Europe that did not weaken the position of the Soviet Union but actually strengthened it. Thus there was no reason not to popularize and to help the Yugoslavs.
    But there was an even more significant factor in this. Though allied with the Western democracies, the Soviet system, or, rather, the Soviet Communists, felt alone in the struggle. They were fighting for their own survival and exclusively for their way of life. And in view of the absence of a second front, that is, major battles in the West at a time that was decisive for the fate of the Russian people, even the ordinary man and common soldier felt alone. The Yugoslav uprising helped dispel that loneliness on the part of the leaders and the people.
    Both as a Communist and as a Yugoslav I was moved by the love and regard that I encountered everywhere, especially in the Red Army. With a clear conscience I inscribed in the guest book of an exhibition of captured German weapons: “I am proud that there are no weapons here from Yugoslavia!”—for there were weapons there