Where will the contact be made? Under what pretext would the recruiter initiate the first conversation? What to do if the target recoils and refuses any cold turkey contact, or luckily appears to be open to the dynamics of the contact? How would the relationship continue, and for how long? When will the target become a real asset—that is, shift from being a valuable person within an enemy’s ranks, to becoming a spy or a defector?
According to Alex, motivating an asset to defect is always a serious consideration for the recruiting intelligence service. What would serve its interests best? Leaving the asset in place as a spy, or extricating him to debrief him thoroughly? But what do you do with him once the information he has is squeezed out? Maybe engage him as an instructor for intelligence combatants intending to infiltrate the asset’s former country, that is, if he qualifies and if he won't risk the combatants if he returns.
Alex used to lean on his lectern, and say in his English-accented Hebrew, “ Listen to me , don’t take notes; we’ll rehearse all this in the field so many times that it’ll be engraved in your minds .”
And indeed it is. Alex’s first rule of recruiting: “ Be careful .” I remember exactly where I was when I heard him say this: the front row.
“ Did I already say careful ?” Alex went on, rubbing his tweed, “ I mean extremely careful. Any potential asset whom you think is ready for the move could betray you when you least expect it. It’s happened before and it’ll happen again. In the intelligence business in general, and in recruiting in particular, there are no morals, no ethics, no sentiments, no friendships—only interests. That means you can’t trust anyone. Therefore, all recruiting attempts should be made outside the target’s country. If you try recruiting a target in his home country, you never know whom he’ll be bringing to the next meeting—it could be half of his country’s counterintelligence agents to make your life miserable for years, not to mention that they may be scoping a potential target for their own recruitment. Therefore, Rule #2 is: ‘If at all possible, approach a potential asset when he is out of his home country’.”
With that wisdom in mind, it is clear why international conventions attended by scientists, government officials, or anyone with access to national security secrets are recruiters' favorite safaris. In these circumstances, the approach can be especially well disguised, with the spotter or the recruiter actually participating in the convention as a bona fide professional. A nuclear scientist won’t be nearly as suspicious if he’s approached during a convention by another scientist wearing the convention’s ID tag.
“I’ve read your recent work, and I’m really fascinated by your findings,” could be an opening line. A little brown-nosing never hurt anyone. Then comes more talk about the “findings,” maybe a few drinks at the bar, exchanging business cards and departing as friends. Then you send him a short courtesy letter with a benign question – “I have a question… on page 123 of your article you said that…could you elaborate a bit?” When an answer comes, and it always comes because scientists love talking about their papers- you thank him, suggesting you’d like to return the favor regarding his “articles" and asking whether he’ll be participating in the next convention. Once you meet again, you’re already good friends. You suggest jointly authoring an article to be published in a top peer reviewed scientific magazine. You say, “The editor was my brother’s classmate. It doesn’t mean that he’ll publish an article not fit for print, but with so much congestion on his desk, it might put ours on the top of the pile waiting for peer review.”
And so on.
In a class of twelve cadets in the Operational Course at the Mossad, only three were sent to international conventions to try out