Hannibal by Ernle Bradford Read Free Book Online Page B

Spain as his ‘province’—always the long-term Roman intention. Hannibal heard during the winter that Rome was fitting out a new fleet, and this, followed by Scipio’s appointment, confirmed his judgement that the enemy had their eye on Spain. The siege and sack of Saguntum, which they claimed as an ally, was something that could not be tolerated if Roman prestige was not to be eclipsed among Gauls and Iberians alike. They had command of the sea—Hannibal having little more than a few warships for the immediate protection of shipping between Spain and North Africa—and a landing of the legions in Spain was now to be expected. Hasdrubal received instructions from his brother to take command in Spain should Hannibal be absent at any time during a Roman attack.
    So far Hannibal’s master-plan seemed to be bearing fruit. The enemy, conscious of their supremacy at sea, were clearly preparing to transport legions via Massilia for an invasion of the new Carthaginian territories south of the Ebro. But what the Romans could not have imagined was that Hannibal was not preparing to defend his new territories himself, nor even planning merely to cross the river to carry on his campaigns in the north. They themselves would never have envisaged traversing the wild Pyrenees, the unknown lands of savage Gauls, and then the fearsome Alps, in order to engage their enemy. Such a course would be nothing less than fifteen hundred miles of madness…. They had reckoned without the Carthaginian.  
     
     

 
    VI
     
    OPENING MOVES
     
    Hannibal now had his war—and on his own terms. He had most of Spain south of the Ebro united behind him, his brother in command in their strong new city-port, and all the men and more that he needed for his army. Owing to his political strategy the war had been declared by the Romans and it was they who could be seen as having broken the peace treaty with Carthage. This was not unimportant, for it could be quoted to hesitant Gallic tribes as an example of Rome’s lack of faith—and a reminder to them not to take their word when treaties were in the offing. Outmanoeuvred by Hannibal as they were often to be in both political and military terms, it was hardly surprising that in years to come the Romans should coin the expression ‘Punic faith’ to signify untrustworthiness and lack of faith—something of which they were well aware that they had been guilty themselves. They knew they had been wrong over Sardinia and they either were, or had been made to seem, in the wrong over Saguntum.
    Hannibal had made careful dispositions of his troops to safeguard Africa as well as Spain, and to ensure that his brother Hasdrubal was not confronted with any problems of loyalty while he was away. He adopted the wise policy of transferring Spanish troops to Africa and African troops to Spain. Polybius may be considered an accurate authority on the state of the military chessboard at the beginning of the campaign: ‘The troops who crossed to Africa were supplied by the Thersitae, Mastiani, Iberian Oretes and Olcades, and numbered twelve hundred horse and thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot, besides which there were eight hundred and seventy Balearians [Slingers]…. He stationed most of these troops at Metagonia in Libya and some in Carthage itself. From the so-called Metagonian towns he sent four thousand foot to Carthage to serve both as reinforcements and as hostages.’ In Spain he left fifteen thousand men, twenty-one elephants, and a small fleet of about fifty warships. As evidence for his documentation of Hannibal’s dispositions Polybius concludes: ‘No one need be surprised at the accuracy of the information I give here about Hannibal’s arrangement in Spain…. The fact is that I found on the Lacinian promontory [in southern Italy] a bronze tablet on which Hannibal himself had made out these lists during the time he was in Italy, and thinking this an absolutely first-rate authority, decided to