Human Cargo by Caroline Moorehead Read Free Book Online Page A

asylum, or only the right to “seek” it. The all-important Article 33, about
nonrefoulement
—the not sending back of refugees to countries where they faced persecution—was pushed through by the French, who reminded the others of the fate of the Jews trying to flee the Nazis. The nations of eastern Europe declined to attend the sessions, saying that in their view the refugees left in the camps in Europe were all traitors, and the United States argued strongly that the new organization’s mandate should be one of protection only, not of assistance or relief, and that its budget should be limited. The meetings, Professor Henkin recalls, which took place in Washington and on the shores of Lake Geneva, were on the whole good-tempered, but not without argument, for the British wanted host states to bear responsibility for the refugees on their territory (and had very few) while the French (who had many) wanted other countries to share the burden. Germany, Austria, and Italy, all of which were overwhelmed by the large numbers of refugees still living in camps, had no voice at the table.
    The document that emerged—in a surprisingly short space of time, little more than six weeks—was a simple reflection of the immediate postwar world. The terms it came up with remain in use to this day. The definition of a refugee, according to Article 1 of the Convention, revolved around the idea of persecution, “a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” The phrase “asylum seeker” would apply to someone seeking refugee status. The persecutors, it was tacitly agreed, were the totalitarianCommunist regimes, and the refugees were therefore, by definition, “good.” “Bad” refugees lay well into the future. In the 1950s, “good” refugees were seen to be useful pawns in Cold War diplomacy. “Migrants,” it was spelled out, were people who could go home; “refugees” were those who could not. That there would soon be people fleeing in great numbers from poverty, generalized violence, or lives without bearable futures, was not foreseen. The “durable solutions” to the lives of refugees, which UNHCR undertook to explore, included resettlement in another country, integration nearby, or (only if the refugee wished it) repatriation. In 2004, the Refugee Convention, together with the 1967 Protocol that extended its scope beyond Europe to take in the rest of the world, remains the most important international document on refugee protection. It is the foundation of EU policy toward refugees, and ratification is a condition of European Union membership.
    In 1951, however, it reflected the concerns of the day. The decision was taken not to include the 458,000 exiled Palestinians who, for political reasons, were to be assisted by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, with the result that there would be no international organization to protect them. And there was much discussion about what groups UNHCR should concern itself with. “Internally displaced” people—later called IDPs—who had not crossed an international border in their flight, were eventually excluded. Sovereignty was not challenged. While the new agency could assist or at least protect refugees once they had fled over a border, it was not invited to concern itself with what had led them to leave home in the first place. UNHCR, opening its doors for business in Geneva, not far from the Palais des Nations and in the company of a growing number of aid agencies and international organizations now clustering together in Switzerland, was given a very small budget, an emergency fund to be used only in dire necessity, a few rooms, and a handful of staff.
    In 2001, UNHCR celebrated its fiftieth birthday. No international organization, argues Gil Loescher, the author of a comprehensive and authoritative evaluation of its achievements, has everhad such an