distances, acute famine, many years, and immediate self-interest. Quite simply, a half-century later, against all counter-vailing forces, obligation triumphed.
If a half-century-long obligation appears to be a one of a kind sort of thing, explained by some unique feature of Ethiopian culture, consider the solution toanother initially baffling case. On May 27, 2007, a Washington, DC-based government official named Christiaan Kroner spoke to a news reporter with unconcealed pride in the governmental action that had followed the Hurricane Katrina disaster, detailing how “pumps, ships, helicopters, engineers, and humanitarian relief” had been sent both rapidly and adeptly to the flooded city of New Orleans and to many other sites of the calamity (Hunter, 2007). Say what? In the face of widespread recognition of the Federal government’s scandalously delayed and monstrously inept reaction to the tragedy, how could he possibly make such a statement? For example, at the time of his claim, the government’s vaunted Road Home program designed to aid Louisiana homeowners still hadn’t delivered funds to 80 percent of those requesting assistance, even though nearly eighteen months had past. Could it be that Mr. Kroner is even more shameless than most politicians are reputed to be? It turns out not. In fact, he was wholly justified in feeling gratified by his government’s efforts because he was not an official of the United States; instead, he was the Dutch ambassador to the United States, and he was speaking of the remarkable assistance rendered to the Katrina-racked American Gulf Coast by the Netherlands.
But, with that matter resolved, an equally puzzling question arises: Why the Netherlands? Other countries had offered aid in the aftermath of the storm. But none had come close to matching the immediate and ongoing commitment of the Dutch to the region. Indeed, Mr. Kroner went on to assure the flood victims that his government would be with them for the long term, stating that “everything we can do and everything Louisiana wants us to do, we are ready to do.” Mr. Kroner also suggested one telling reason for this extraordinary willingness to help: The Netherlands owed it to New Orleans—for more than half a century. On January 31, 1953 an unrelenting gale pushed fierce North Sea waters across a quarter-million acres of his country, leveling dikes, levees, and thousands of homes while killing 2,000 residents. Soon thereafter, Dutch officials requested and received aid and technical assistance from their counterparts in New Orleans, which resulted in the construction of a new system of water pumps that have since protected the country from similarly destructive floods. One wonders why it seems that the same levels of support for New Orleans provided by officials of a foreign government never came from the city’s own national government. Perhaps the officials of that government didn’t think they owed New Orleans enough.
If so, those officials would be safe to expect that the residents of New Orleans now think they owe little to government—as voters, volunteers, contributors, and, most regrettably, even as law abiding citizens. As the poet W. H. Auden put it, “I and the world know/what every schoolboy learns./Those to whom evil is done/do evil in return.” Perhaps it is not so surprising then that in 2007, despite constant patrols by the National Guard, state police officers, and the graduates of two new classes of city police recruits, New Orleans’ homicide rate jumped 30 percent, breaking all records and making it the bloodiest city in the country. More generally, it can be said that the rule for reciprocation assures that, whether the fruit of our actions is sweet or bitter, we reap what we sow.
How the Rule Works
Make no mistake, human societies derive a truly significant competitive advantage from the reciprocity rule and, consequently, they make sure their members are trained to comply with and believe
Jan (ILT) J. C.; Gerardi Greenburg