The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance by Rupert Matthews Read Free Book Online Page A

however, was to stay where he was and keep an eye on the French moving to his front.
     
    Trying to out-think Napoleon
     
    Blücher had faced Napoleon before and knew him to be a master of manoeuvre. One of Napoleon’s greatest victories had been won almost without firing a shot. In October 1805 Napoleon was facing the Austrian commander Mack von Leibereich on the Danube near Ulm in Bavaria. Napoleon marched around 80,000 men into view of the Austrian scouts, but kept some 40,000 men out of sight. Studying Napoleon’s movements, Mack concluded that the French were going to try to work around the right flank of his army of 60,000 men to cut him off from Vienna. Mack therefore spent the next two days watching Napoleon’s slow advance while preparing elaborate defences on the right to stop the French.
    Napoleon, however, had meanwhile sent most of his army in the opposite direction and by a series of rapid, lengthy marches managed to get behind Mack’s defences before the Austrians realized that Napoleon was not where they thought he was. Over the next five days, Napoleon hustled Mack from one untenable position to another until he was trapped with his back to the Danube without food, ammunition or hope of relief. Mack surrendered his entire army. Napoleon lost only 500 men.
    At Austerlitz Napoleon with 67,000 men had faced a joint Austro-Russian army of 86,000. Napoleon spent most of 1 December 1805 manoeuvring his army in full view of the enemy, apparently intending to attack the next morning on the right flank of the Austro-Russians where the land was open and suitable for cavalry charges. That night, under cover of darkness, the Russians secretly moved their main force from the hills in their centre to their right to meet Napoleon’s attack.
    This was, in fact, exactly what Napoleon had wanted. During the night he had moved his main force to the centre. At dawn he launched a massive assault up the hills, smashed the Russian centre then wheeled to take their right wing in the rear. Taken by surprise in flank and rear the Austro-Russians fled. Few managed to get far, for Napoleon’s cavalry swooped on them. Napoleon lost 1,305 men dead. The Austro-Russians lost 16,000 dead and 22,000 taken prisoner.
    These sorts of cunningly concealed manoeuvres were typical of Napoleon. It was almost axiomatic that what he seemed to intend to do was not what he would actually do. One commentator compared the connection between Napoleon’s intentions and his actions as ‘white knight to black bishop’. By concentrating his forces at Sombreffe, Blücher was hoping to keep his options open. The roads would allow him to move east, west or north depending on what Napoleon was doing.
    Wellington was equally wary of committing his troops until he knew what Napoleon was actually up to. He remained concerned that Napoleon would seek to work around his right flank to cut the British off from the English Channel. Wellington sent out orders that all units should be ready to march at short notice with full equipment, but he did not move any unit.
    Louis-Nicolas Davout
 
Davout was born into a family of the lower nobility and joined the Royal French army just before the Revolution as a cavalry lieutenant. His noble birth got him into some minor trouble, but his skills saw him through and by 1792 he was a brigadier general. Davout’s marriage to a pretty girl named Aimée Leclerc turned out to be highly advantageous as her brother was married to the sister of another young general – Napoleon Bonaparte. As Napoleon rose, so did Davout. His organizational skills were matched by his tactical ability: at Auerstädt in October 1806, for instance, he defeated a Prussian army of 63,000 with only 28,000 men. When Napoleon fell from power, Davout was defending the fortified city of Hamburg against overwhelming odds and surrendered only when he learned Napoleon had abdicated. When Napoleon returned to power Davout was summoned to become minister of war,