The Irish Revolution, 1916-1923 by Marie Coleman Read Free Book Online Page B

failure to seize the telegraph office at Crown Alley, just across the river from the GPO, or the greatest propaganda prize of all, Dublin Castle. There is still much debate about whether the Volunteers ever planned to capture the castle or were deterred in the mistaken belief that it was too well defended. The ICA garrison under Seán Connolly mistakenly opted instead for the nearby City Hall, from which they were easily ejected within a day by British reinforcements and where Seán Connolly was killed by a sniper from the castle (Townshend, 2005: 162–4; McGarry, 2010: 141).
    The ease with which the rebels occupied their targeted buildings illustrates the extent to which the administration, police and army were taken unawares by the rebellion. Both the commander of the army in Ireland, General Friend, and the Chief Secretary, Augustine Birrell, were in England for Easter and there were only 400 soldiers scattered across the various barracks in Dublin City. While an armed uprising was not expected, the authorities were well aware that elaborate Volunteer manoeuvres had been planned for Easter Sunday, which makes their lackadaisical attitude to security difficult to explain. In Birrell's absence, the civilian response was handled by the Under Secretary, Sir Matthew Nathan, who appears to have underestimated the rebellion and been at a loss to respond in the absence of Birrell. Arthur Hamilton Norway, the head of the Irish Post Office, spent Easter Monday morning in Dublin Castle with Nathan, whom he described as ‘a man who was not cool and steady, but rather bewildered’ ( Jeffery, 2006a: 44). Birrell and Nathan had adopted a tolerant approach to both the Volunteers and the ICA prior to the Rising, leaving them with no choice but to resign immediately afterwards.
    The army responded more quickly and effectively than the civilian administrators. On Tuesday night martial law was declared in Dublin and extended countrywide the following day. Also on Tuesday reinforcements from within the island arrived from the Curragh and Belfast along with heavy artillery from Athlone, underscoring the disastrous effect of the rebels’ failure to secure the railway stations. These were strengthened by reinforcements from Britain who arrived by boat at Kingstown (Dún Laoghaire) on Wednesday. By the end of the week there were 20,000 troops in the city. On Wednesday, the armed yacht, the Helga , began the bombardment of the city from the River Liffey, destroying Liberty Hall (the headquarters of the ITGWU) and much of the centre of the city around the GPO. This barrage, exacerbated by a lack of adequate supplies of food and ammunition, exhaustionand the realisation that no reinforcements were coming for the rebels from either the provinces or Germany, resulted in the collapse of the short-lived Irish Republic when Pearse surrendered on Saturday, 29 April (McGarry, 2010: 167–8, 189–94, 204–6; Townshend, 2005: 186–96).
    Outside Dublin the main activity took place in Cork, Wexford, Meath and Galway. There was an initially poor turn out in Cork on Easter Sunday morning, MacNeill's countermanding order not yet having arrived, suggesting that other factors, such as fear, might also explain why mobilisation was poor in general for the Rising. The demoralised Cork Volunteers demobilised and returned home ‘wet, sore and sorry’ on Easter Sunday night. Wexford Volunteers held the town of Enniscorthy for most of Easter week. In Galway, a small contingent led by Liam Mellows attacked Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) barracks at Oranmore and Athenry. The highest casualties outside of Dublin occurred at Rath Crossroads near Ashbourne, County Meath, where the Volunteers, commanded by Thomas Ashe and Richard Mulcahy, engaged the local RIC in a five-hour gun battle that resulted in the deaths of eight policemen and two Volunteers. Very little mobilisation occurred in Ulster, where Denis McCullough tried unsuccessfully to link up with Mellows in