What Stalin Knew by David E. Murphy Read Free Book Online Page A

Czech government that led to
    the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, the creation of Slovakia, and the
    March 23 occupation of the Memel region.
    Kleist went on to say: ‘‘Hitler . . . has decided it is necessary to bring
    Poland to her knees. To a small circle of persons around Hitler, it was
    known that the last German proposal would be rejected by Poland. Hitler
    and Ribbentrop were convinced that because of foreign and domestic pol-
    icy considerations, the Polish government would not accept the German
    demands. Only for this reason could Germany have been able to insert the
    point in its proposal on guarantees of the inviolability of frontiers for 25
    years. German calculations were correct. On the strength of Poland’s re-
    fusal, we now have a free hand in dealing with her.’’ At this point in his
    briefing, Kleist was probably referring to negotiations with Poland’s for-
    eign minister, Josef Beck.
    Kleist’s next words were harsher:
    If Poland does not agree to German proposals and does not capitu-
    late in the weeks ahead, one can scarcely doubt that in July, August
    she will be the victim of a military attack. . . . Major strategic oppo-
    sition by the Polish army will be overcome in 8–14 days. The attack
    on Poland will be carried out simultaneously from Germany’s east-
    ern border, from Slovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine, and East Prussia. The
    offensive must be carried out in the fiercest way and, as the German
    general staff conceives it, should lead to a stunning success. The
    remaining centers of opposition that will, without doubt, exist in
    the entire country will be suppressed in the most merciless fash-
    ion. . . . German preparations against Poland have been postponed to
    July–August. Military measures will be undertaken not long before
    the offensive. They must be executed thoroughly and completely
    camouflaged.
    Kleist concentrated on the themes for a propaganda offensive against
    Poland, listing the ploys and slogans that were to be emphasized in the
    PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT
    17
    campaign: ‘‘Under the slogan ‘Poland—State of Reaction and Decay,’ we
    must reveal the poverty of the Polish peasants, the cultural backwardness
    of the country, the feudal methods of running the economy and existence
    of a starving Polish population. . . . The goal of this campaign is to affect
    world public opinion and the Polish population; one must achieve a split
    within the Polish nation and dissatisfaction with the Polish leadership on
    the part of the Polish population, exploiting class differences. Preparations
    for the propaganda attack against Poland will take about two months.’’
    Kleist examined various situations that would provide Germany with
    a pretext for initiating military action:
    It would be ideal if the conflict with Poland was not seen as brought
    about by Germany. At the present time, we in Berlin are discussing
    the question of bringing the Ukraine into the affair. Voloshin [A. Volo-
    shin, head of the autonomous government of Carpatho-Ukraine] and
    Iu. Revai [a minister in that government] are agreed concerning . . .
    the broad autonomy of the Carpatho-Ukraine within the framework
    of the Hungarian states. With this we have again won the trust of the
    Ukrainian masses in eastern Galicia and strengthened the frayed
    military might of the Ukraine. No special propaganda is needed to
    work up Ukrainian leading circles; they will remain faithful to Berlin.
    We might later give the western Ukraine the signal to revolt. From
    Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine we could send weapons and
    arms as well as well-trained Ukrainian fighters. There is such close
    contact between Lvov and Berlin that there can be no doubt about an
    uprising in the Ukraine. Thus, creating the seeds of unrest in the
    Ukraine will give Germany the opportunity to intervene militarily on
    a large scale. This project, however, creates concern in Germany over
    one danger—the possible reaction of the Soviet