What Stalin Knew by David E. Murphy Read Free Book Online

respected for his knowledge of
    East European affairs. He developed a close relationship with German am-
    bassador Hans-Adolf von Moltke, who frequently sought his advice and
    through whom he was able to meet, assess, and recruit several individuals
    who would produce outstanding intelligence reports.
    Among them was the redoubtable Ilse Stöbe (code name Alta), a well-
    known journalist in her own right as well as Herrnstadt’s mistress. She
    PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT
    15
    later served as the communications link with some of Herrnstadt’s best
    sources, who had been transferred to Berlin and Bucharest. She was ar-
    rested by the Gestapo in August 1942 but she never betrayed a single
    person. Among those she worked with was Gerhard Kegel (code name
    KhVS), an employee of the Trade Section of the German embassy in War-
    saw, who would later be assigned to the Moscow embassy. Another was
    Rudolf von Scheliha (code name Ariets), first secretary in the German
    embassy in Warsaw; after the German conquest of Poland, he was as-
    signed to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin. A member of the German
    foreign service for many years, he had excellent contacts in German politi-
    cal and military circles. The third and fourth members of this Warsaw
    group were Kurt and Margarita Völkisch (code names AVS and LTsL). Kurt
    dealt with press matters in the Warsaw embassy and was later assigned to
    the embassy in Bucharest. Margarita, his wife, worked there as a secretary.
    Taken as a whole, this group provided the RU with some of its best intel-
    ligence on German plans and activities.
    On May 17, 1939, Proskurov sent a report to Stalin with a six-page
    attachment entitled ‘‘The Future Plans of Aggression by Fascist Germany
    in the Estimation of an Official of the German Foreign Ministry, Kleist.’’
    The report was classified ‘ Top Secret’’ ( Sovershenno Sekretno ) and ‘‘Of Spe-
    cial Interest’’ ( Osobo Interesno ). Provided by the Warsaw residency of So-
    viet military intelligence, it was based on a briefing given by Dr. Peter
    Kleist, head of the Eastern Department of Ribbentrop’s office, to senior
    officers of the German embassy in Warsaw during Kleist’s visit there on
    May 2, 1939.1 Coincidentally, May 2 was the day Stalin informed Mak-
    sim M. Litvinov that he would be replaced by Molotov as commissar of
    foreign affairs. Litvinov was Jewish and had favored an agreement with
    England and France to curb Nazi aggression. Thus, Stalin’s action was a
    signal to Hitler of the possibility of an agreement between their two coun-
    tries. This was to be one of the first steps in a minuet that would be danced
    by Moscow, Berlin, London, and Paris during the next few months over the
    question of what to do about Poland.
    Kleist’s comments on Hitler’s plans for Poland and his longer-range
    intentions must have been read by Stalin with great interest. Kleist, after
    all, was the one person in Ribbentrop’s immediate entourage who was
    continuously involved in German actions in Eastern Europe. He began by
    stating that ‘‘Germany at the present moment is in the first phase of its
    military consolidation in the east, which, without regard to ideological
    considerations, must be achieved by whatever means. After the merciless
    16
    PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT
    cleansing of the east will come the western phase that must end in the
    defeat of France and England either by military or by political means. Only
    after this can one count on the feasibility of the destruction of the Soviet
    Union. At the present time we are still in the phase of military consolida-
    tion in the East. It is Poland’s turn next. . . . The preparations already taken
    by Germany—the creation of the protectorate in Bohemia and Moravia,
    the creation of a Slovakian state, the annexation of the Memel region—
    were all directed against Poland.’’ Here Kleist was presumably referring to
    the March 15, 1939, agreement forced on the