What Stalin Knew by David E. Murphy Read Free Book Online Page B

Union. If we think
    otherwise, the Ukrainian factor will be put into play in the future.
    Signing the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact precluded this scheme. It
    demonstrates, however, the degree to which the Germans had made com-
    mon cause with Ukrainian nationalists, a factor that would become active
    in the spring and summer of 1941.
    Kleist’s view of the future was oddly prophetic:
    We adhere to the view that a conflict with Poland can be localized.
    England and France, as in the past, are not ready to act on Poland’s
    behalf. If we crush Poland’s main opposition in a short time, then En-
    gland may demonstrate with her fleet in the Mediterranean. France
    will rattle its guns behind the Maginot line—that will end the affair. If,
    despite expectations, a European war begins in connection with a
    18
    PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT
    German attack on Poland, then we’ll know that a German strike
    against Poland will serve as a pretext for a preventive war against Ger-
    many by the Western powers—something agreed on in advance. . . . If
    this happens, Hitler will be ready to engage in lengthy discussions. In
    any case, we will not allow ourselves to be provoked at a time not of
    our choosing. Choice of the moment for action we reserve to our-
    selves. At present we have decided not to involve ourselves in a Euro-
    pean war as a result of our inadequate readiness and, for us, the unre-
    warding international situation; however, in three or four months we
    can be completely ready. The German command is convinced it will
    be victorious . . . because of our aviation. According to the calcula-
    tions of our military specialists, all the ports of England can be de-
    stroyed within six hours. The destructive action of German aviation
    has up until now, been demonstrated only once, during the Spanish
    civil war in the port of Guernica. The success was stupendous—the
    city was flattened. In this light, the defeat of England and France will
    not be a difficult affair. . . . America will not intervene in time and the
    Soviet Union will stay neutral.
    Kleist continued his prophesying:
    In order to deliver a blow against Poland, at present Berlin has be-
    gun to be intensively involved in the southeast. We must get closer to
    Romania. Gafencu [the Romanian foreign minister] spread around
    kind words in Berlin but then in London and Paris engaged in anti-
    German politics. We will not achieve our goals this way. Direct pres-
    sure on Bucharest is needed. . . . We will . . . make Hungary a German
    protectorate and then move troops up to Romania’s borders. Ro-
    mania will capitulate. We expect to achieve our goals in the Baltic
    States in a different way. The neutrality of the Baltic States in the
    event of war is just as important to us as is the neutrality of Belgium
    or Holland. Some time later, when a favorable moment occurs for
    us, we can violate it but for now, on the strength of the nonaggres-
    sion pact concluded earlier [with Poland in 1934], we avoid auto-
    matic interference by the Soviet Union.
    In conclusion, he said: ‘‘Thus, the offensive against Poland is set for July or
    August. If the Poles provoke a preventive war against us before that time,
    things will be different. Whether we respond to this provocation with an
    offensive will depend on the Führer’s decision and his evaluation of the
    international situation. In any case, it would be unpleasant for us if the
    Poles force us into war at present, when the international situation does
    not favor us and our preparations for war are not yet in place.’’
    After reading the report, Stalin wrote this instruction in the margin:
    PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT
    19
    ‘‘Speak with Proskurov—who is this ‘source’?’’ The word source was under-
    lined twice. Proskurov had an answer to Stalin’s question. There were
    three Soviet agents among the officers of the German embassy in Warsaw:
    Rudolf von Scheliha, Gerhard Kegel, and Kurt Völkisch, whose